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treatment of lessors’ claims.4 Consequently, the Covid-19 pandemic has created challenges that 
have further complicated the already unclear applicability of § 365(d)(3).5  
This memorandum analyzes a court’s ability to defer a debtor’s statutory rent obligations 
on unexpired leases. Part I discusses the majority and minority positions regarding § 365(d)(3) 
rent deferral issues that were prevalent in jurisprudence prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. Part II 
addresses how the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, one of the first courts to 
address the issue of rent deferral during a pandemic, approached these unparalleled 
circumstances. Part III analyzes how courts have since dealt with these issues throughout the 
pandemic. 
I. Courts are Split on the Issue of Delaying Rent Obligations under § 365(d)(3). 
 
 Historically, the majority of courts have taken the view that § 365(d)(3) is ambiguous as 
to the timing of exactly when the statute requires the payment of rent that accrues post-petition 
on unexpired leases.6 Accordingly, the majority of courts have adopted the accrual method to 
deal with § 365(d)(3) related issues.7 In contrast, the minority of courts have applied the billing 
method to analyze § 365(d)(3) issues.8 The key difference between the two methods is how 
 
4 See In re McCrory Corp., 210 B.R. 934, 936–937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
5 See In re Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 615 B.R. at 198. 
6 See In re McCrory Corp., 210 B.R. at 937; see In re travel 2000, Inc., 264 B.R. 444, 450 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich 2001) (“When applying 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) to the circumstances of the 
case before us, ambiguity emanates from the words ‘arises’ and ‘obligation.’.”); see also In re 
Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d. 986, 989 (6th Cir. 2000) (highlighting that there is a 
“split of authority within the district and bankruptcy courts as to the proper interpretation of this 
provision.”). 
7 See In re McCrory Corp., 210 B.R. at 937. 
8 See id. 
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courts view the distinction between prepetition and post-petition obligations in relation to the 
petition date.9  
A. The Majority of Courts Allow Rent to be Deferred Under the Accrual Method. 
Under the accrual method, courts view anything that has accrued after the entry of the 
order for relief as “a post-petition charge that may be elevated to administrative priority under § 
507(a)."10 As such, the majority of courts have used this framework to defer post-petition rent 
and rent related obligations.11 Furthermore, the majority approach uses the accrual method for 
the sake of differentiating prepetition obligations from post-petition with regard to when the 
obligation to pay rent under a lease arises.12  
Additionally, the majority of courts treat lessors’ claims for post-petition rent as 
administrative expense claims “payable upon the effective date of any plan of reorganization in 
these cases,” instead of treating them as a superpriority that would require immediate payment.13 
For example, these courts have dealt with stub rent claims by allowing it to be prorated but have 






9 See In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 447 B.R. 475, 507 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (noting that the 
discrepancy between the two analytical approaches was the treatment of the petition date). 
10 See id. at 508. 
11 See id. at 508–509. 
12 See id.; see also In re McCrory Corp., 210 B.R. at 937. 
13 In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 447 B.R at 511–512. 
14 See id. at 511 (“[T]he Debtors should not be ordered to pay the Stub Rent immediately. Stub 
Rent is not entitled to superpriority but only to administrative priority pursuant to § 507(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”). 
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B. Courts That Have Taken the Minority Approach, Require Payment of Rent 
Obligations Immediately.  
 
A minority of courts utilize the billing method to address § 365(d)(3) timing issues.15 
Under the billing method, a debtor must pay its rent when due under the lease “during the post-
petition, prerejection period, regardless of when those charges accrued.”16 Further, under the 
billing method, unpaid postpetition rent is generally due for immediate payment (in accordance 
with the lease terms) regardless of the effect that requiring such payment would have on the 
assets of the estate.17 Courts that adopt this approach typically refuse to grant a debtor’s request 
for rent deferral.18 For example, if a debtor rejects a lease after the debtor’s monthly rent 
obligation has arisen for that month, the billing method rejects the notion of awarding lessors a 
deferred pro rata share of rent in favor of finding that lessors are entitled to immediate payment 
of that full month’s rent.19  
The minority view is predicated on the congressional intent behind § 365(d)(3), which 
was to relieve the burden that rent related uncertainties place on nonresidential lessors during the 
intervening period between a debtor’s petition filing and the assumption or rejection of a lease.20  
And the minority of courts view the language of § 365(d)(3) as clear and unambiguous.21 In 
support of the statute’s language being unambiguous, the Sixth Circuit, in In re Koenig Sporting 
 
15 See In re McCrory Corp., 210 B.R. at 937–938. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 See In re Oreck Corp., 506 B.R. 500, 504 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2014). 
19 See In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d. 986, 989 (6th Cir. 2000) (“In this case, 
involving a month-to-month, payment-in-advance lease, where the debtor had complete control 
over the obligation, we believe that equity as well as the statute favors full payment to 
[landlord].”). 
20 See id. (quoting In re Cannonsburg Envtl. Assocs., 72 F.3d 1260) (stating that the purpose of § 
365(d)(3) is to “prevent parties in contractual or lease relationships with the debtor from being 
left in doubt concerning their status vis-a-vis the estate.”). 
21 See id. 
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Goods, Inc, relied on the fact that because rent obligations are due in advance, generally on the 
first of each month, the lessors have an unpaid claim against the estate for failure to timely pay 
the rent obligation just “like anything else.”22 The Sixth Circuit therefore held that the statute’s 
language supports this treatment of those claims.23 And unlike the majority interpretation, their 
view is that the statute’s meaning is not actually predicated on reading the words “arise” and 
“obligation” as requiring an analysis of when in the petition process the rent was due because the 
debtor knew of the charges in advance of filing.24 Thus, historically the court split has hinged on 
whether the language of § 365(d)(3) is ambiguous or not.25  
II. The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia Held That § 365(d)(3) 
Authorized the Court to Grant Debtor Relief. 
 
In re Pier 1 Imports, Inc., was one of the first cases to address the impact of the pandemic 
on a debtor’s rent obligations.26 With stay-at-home orders and mandatory closures of 
nonessential retail businesses affecting Pier 1’s ability to carry out its Chapter 11 reorganization, 
Pier 1 faced the challenge of satisfying their rent obligations and sought relief from the courts.27  
 In the early stages of the pandemic, the Pier 1 court for the recognized that even though 
§ 365(d)(3) had never been applied to anything like a global pandemic, past jurisprudence 
weighed in favor of permitting the court to defer rent obligations if doing so would be in the best 
 
22 See In re Oreck Corp., 506 B.R. at 504 (citing In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d 
986). 
23 See In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d. at 989. 
24 See id. 
25 See In re McCrory Corp., 210 B.R. 934, 937–938 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
26 See In re Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 615 B.R. 196, 197–198 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2020). 
27 See id. (noting that the impact of mandatory closures on the Chapter 11 debtor was that they 
saw go-forward stores’ sales fall approximately 65% compared to the prior year and that Pier 1 
instituted remedial measures to preserve liquidity, ranging from furloughing employees, closing 
stores, decreasing salaries, and reaching out landlords to negotiate possible rent deferrals, that 
were unsuccessful in offsetting losses enough to allow Pier 1 to satisfy its rent duties). 
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interests of the estate.28 Moreover, the court did not hold that the debtors were relieved of their 
duty to pay rent but instead held that in light of the present circumstances, the statute permitted 
the debtors to defer “such rent obligations as they accrue through the Limited Operations Period 
to be paid at a later date.”29 Accordingly, the court determined that the lessors’ claims were to be 
treated as administrative expense claims instead of superpriority treatment because the court held 
that lessors were not entitled at this time to be paid before other “accrued but unpaid 
administrative expense claims.”30  
In support of its approach, the court cited the fact that there was no other feasible 
alternative at this time to the relief sought.31 The court reasoned that even if it were to read the 
statute a in a way that forced the debtor to liquidate to meet their rent obligations, such 
liquidation is not possible since the debtor was forced to remain closed and could not generate 
the revenue necessary to pay rent.32 Also, the court further supported this approach by addressing 
issues of lessors’ entitlement to adequate protection pursuant to § 361 and § 363 of the 
Bankruptcy code.33 Section 361 defines adequate protection as compensating “non-debtor[s] to 
the extent any proposed lease” would cause a decrease in the value of that entity’s interest in the 
subject property.34 But the court held that this did not require debtors provide lessors with 
 
28 See id. at 204. 
29 Id. at 201. 
30 Id. at 202.   
31 See id. at 203. 
32 See id. at 203–204 (“The Debtors cannot effectively liquidate the inventory while their stores 
remain closed.”). 
33 See id. 202–203. 
34 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2018).   
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immediate payment and that administrative expense claim treatment coupled with debtors’ 
remedial measures and assurance of cure payment was sufficient.35  
Therefore, the court determined that in light of the “unforeseen, and unforeseeable glitch 
in the administration of the Debtors' Bankruptcy Cases[,]” § 365(d)(3) was correctly read as 
authorizing courts to delay a debtor’s rent obligations under appropriate circumstances if delay is 
in the best interests of the estate.36  
III. Other Courts Have Also Evaluated Covid-19’s Impact on Rent Obligations. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed similar issues to that of In re Pier 1 Imports, 
Inc., with some courts taking somewhat similar approaches to the Pier 1 court.37 For instance, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, in In re Cinemax USA Real Estate 
Holdings, Inc., took an analytical approach that resembled the In re Pier 1 Imports court in some 
ways, but still had some notable differences.38  
The Cinemax USA court applied the doctrines of force majeure and frustration of purpose 
in the context of § 365(d)(3) rent issues.39 According to the court, the debtor was not required to 
 
35 See In re Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 615 B.R. at 203 (“The Court found that, to the extent adequate 
protection is required, the continued payment of the related non-rent payments and assurance of 
cure payment in July is sufficient to protect the Lessors against any perceived diminution in 
value.”). 
36 See id. at 203–204; see In re Modell's Sporting Goods, Inc., No. 20-14179 (VFP), Docket No. 
166 (Bankr. D. N.J. March 27, 2020) (holding that the pandemic warranted granting debtors an 
additional deferral of rent obligations beyond the initial 60-day period because doing so was in 
the best interests of the estate); see also In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. 374, 378–79 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2020) (holding that § 365(d)(3) authorized the court to defer rent obligations). 
37 See In re Modell's Sporting Goods, Inc., Docket No. 166 (granting debtor relief because relief 
was in the best interests of the estate); see In re CraftWorks Parent, LLC., No. 20-10475 (BLS), 
Docket No. 217 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 30, 2020) (granting debtor a suspension of rent payments 
while bankruptcy proceedings were paused due to the pandemic); see also In re Cinemax USA 
Real Estate Holdings, Inc., No. 20-14695-BKC-LMI, 2021 WL 564486 at *1, *5 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. Jan. 27, 2021) (approving relief for the debtor). 
38 See In re Cinemax USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 2021 WL 564486 at *5. 
39 See id. 
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pay rent for the time that their business was closed as a result of the pandemic because the 
“pandemic was completely unforeseeable.”40 Further, this court determined that § 365(d)(3) by 
itself was not a sufficient basis for courts to defer rent obligations for cause due to pandemic 
related issues.41 But this court also held that § 365(d)(3) did not bar the court from granting 
debtors relief.42 The court instead found § 365(d)(3) impliedly allowed it to use the doctrines of 
force majeure and frustration of purpose to still grant debtor relief and extinguished the debtor’s 
obligation to pay rent for the intervening period that debtor remained closed from Covid-19 
instead of deferring the rent and converting it to an administrative expense claim.43  
However, at least one court has disagreed with the Pier 1 court and declined to read § 
365(d)(3) as authorizing the court to grant debtor further relief.44 The Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Texas, in In re CEC Entertainment, Inc., declined to view § 365(d)(3) as 
giving the court the power to alter the debtor’s rent obligations.45 This court evaluated whether it 
could grant debtor relief in the form of rent deferral or rent reduction at venues that the debtor 
operated in three states that were experiencing closures due to the pandemic and related 
government mandates.46 However, the court held that the meaning of the statute was not only 
clear, but it required that a debtor, who is a commercial real property lessee, must continue to 
timely perform its lease obligations.47  
 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 See In re CEC Entertainment, Inc., No. 20-33163, 2020 WL 7356380 at *1, *1 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. Dec. 14, 2020) (declining to provide relief to debtor). 
45 See id. at *4. 
46 See id. at *1. 
47 See id. at *4 (“Section 365(d)(3) unambiguously requires that debtors timely perform 
obligations under commercial leases. The [c]ourt cannot override that statutory mandate.”). 
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Conclusion 
 The Covid-19 pandemic has complicated an already divisive court split on the language 
and applicability of § 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code on rent obligations, with the majority of 
courts finding the section's language to be ambiguous.48 During the pandemic, most courts have 
utilized some variation of the accrual method to ease the burden the pandemic and its related 
government mandates have placed on debtors.49 A majority of courts that have issued written 
decisions on the rent deferral issue during the pandemic have determined that despite the 
statutory obligation to pay rent, a court may delay that obligation under appropriate 
circumstances if delay is in the best interests of the estate.50 Still, one court has declined to 
interpret § 365(d)(3) as providing courts the authority to affect such a remedy and grant relief to 
debtors in the form of a rent deferral.51 Thus, the pandemic has not changed the fact that courts 








48 See In re CEC Entertainment, Inc., 2020 WL 7356380 at *5–*6; see also In re McCrory Corp., 
210 B.R. at 937. 
49 See In re Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 615 B.R. 196, 203–204 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2020). 
50 See id. 
51 See In re CEC Entertainment, Inc., 2020 WL 7356380 at *4. 
52 See id. 
